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Abstract. This paper proposes a model that can be implemented
to estimate the willingness to pay for distributive justice, deﬁned as distribu-
tion according to desert. We derive a formula that allows one to recover the
willingness to pay for distributive justice from ﬁscal data and the estimated
coeﬃcients of a probit regression. Using this formula and data from a 1998
Gallup Social Audit, we ﬁnd that on average the monetary value of justice for
US households amounts to about one ﬁfth of their disposable income. More-
over, we ﬁnd evidence of markedly heterogeneous preferences for justice along
the lines of race and education.
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1. Introduction
As proposed long ago by Thurow (1971), a just income distribution may be seen as
a pure public good. This paper develops a method of estimating the monetary value
of that public good and identifying how this value diﬀe r sa c r o s ss u b g r o u p so ft h e
population.
Estimating the monetary value of distributive justice is important for assessing
the eﬃciency implications of governmental action. In many countries, a large share
of the government’s budget is devoted to redistributing income, supposedly for equity
reasons. Since governmental redistribution is costly for society, some knowledge of
society’s willingness to pay for distributive justice is required in order to evaluate
whether that public good is eﬃciently provided.
Moreover, assessing how equity concerns vary in the population can deliver novel
insights into the political economy of income redistribution. As is well known, there is
a wide spectrum of attitudes toward redistribution, even within groups of individuals
with similar market incomes. Diﬀerent preferences for distributive justice constitute
a potential key factor driving diﬀerent demands for redistribution and leading to
diﬀerent political outcomes.
There are various principles of distributive justice; chief among them are equity,
equality and need. In this paper, we assume that people have a preference for equity,
i.e., for living in a society where ”one gets what one deserves, and deserves whatWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 3
one gets”. That is, we posit that the public good desired by people is distribution
according to desert. We propose a method for estimating the monetary value of
distributive justice thus deﬁned that is grounded on an explicit microeconometric
model. The proposed method employs survey data, but without running into the
usual diﬃculties encountered by survey methods for measuring the willingness to pay
for public goods.
Our theoretical framework is a stylized model of demand for governmental redis-
tribution of income in which demand is driven by both selﬁsh pecuniary motives and
a concern for justice. Crucially, the way in which that concern aﬀects demand for re-
distribution depends on individuals’ beliefs regarding the fairness of market incomes.
Individuals who believe market outcomest ob ed e t e r m i n e dm a i n l yb yf a m i l yb a c k -
ground and luck - i.e. factors beyond one’s control - require governmental reduction
of inequality to feel that society is just. Individuals who view market incomes as
resulting from eﬀort and hard work instead perceive laissez-faire as equitable.
For an individual who believes that the pre-ﬁscal distribution of income is unfair,
her willingness to pay for justice is deﬁned as the maximal amount of money that
she would be ready to sacriﬁce in order to prevent the actual income distribution
from switching to the distribution that would arise under laissez-faire. For somebody
who believes that the pre-ﬁscal distribution is fair, her willingness to pay for justice
is deﬁned as the maximal amount of money that she would be ready to sacriﬁce inWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 4
order to switch to laissez-faire.
Our basic model posits individuals with diﬀerent beliefs but common preferences.
The extended model allows for heterogenous preferences; the willingness to pay for
justice can then be decomposed into a part which is common to everybody and type-
speciﬁcp a r t s .
We embed the model of demand for governmental redistribution into a random
utility model. Estimating the latter requires only measures of support for or oppo-
sition to redistribution, beliefs about the fairness of market outcomes, and pre-ﬁscal
incomes. We derive a simple formula that allows one to recover the willingness to
pay for distributive justice from the estimated coeﬃcients of a probit regression and
ﬁscal data. Estimating type-speciﬁc willingnesses to pay simply requires appropriate
interaction terms in the probit regression.
As a ﬁrst application of the proposed estimation method, this paper estimates
the value of distributive justice, i.e. distribution according to desert, in the United
States. Using a large representative sample drawn in 1998, we ﬁnd that Americans’
willingness to pay for distributive justice is substantial: on average, it amounts to
about 20 percent of their disposable income. Moreover, we ﬁnd that preferences for
justice diﬀer according to race and education.
The numerical results obtained from our empirical exercise must be qualiﬁed: the
theoretical framework that we employ entails strong simpliﬁcations and the empiricalWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 5
proxies for our theoretical variables are far from ideal. Hence, much caution is required
when interpreting the estimated willingnesses to pay. More interesting than the
particular numbers obtained, in our view, is the robust ﬁnding that in the US concerns
for distributive justice do matter in monetary terms.
The other major insight from our empirical exercise is that the willingness to
pay for justice, as a fraction of an individual’s income, depends on her race and
education. For any given income and beliefs about the fairness of market outcomes,
white individuals with at least some higher education display a remarkably higher
willingness to pay for justice than the rest of the population. Thus, distributing
income according to desert is of special concern for the educated white. Possibly, non-
educated members of racial minorities endorse another view of distributive justice,
one that puts less emphasis on desert and more on needs or on equality tout court.
Despite this heterogeneity in the value of distributing income according to desert,
diﬀerences in demand for governmental redistribution turn out to be mostly driven
by diﬀerences in the beliefs about the fairness of the market system. We ﬁnd that
diﬀerences in those beliefs are not only more powerful than diﬀerences in preferences,
they are also a stronger determinant of political attitudes than the pre-ﬁscal income
of individuals.
The current paper relates primarily to three recent strands in the literature on
redistributive politics. The ﬁrst consists of theoretical papers that incorporate aWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 6
concern for fairness into models of political redistribution of income. A recent example
is Alesina and Angeletos (2005), who aim at explaining the coexistence of large welfare
states and laissez-faire societies, each associated with diﬀerent perceptions about the
sources of economic disparities. In their model, fairness enters the voters’ utility
function and voters may face a tradeoﬀ between their own consumption and justice.
Piketty (1995) chooses a more extreme modeling option, according to which voters
only care about fairness, i.e. they vote so as to maximize a social welfare function.
Even if they share the same welfare function, individuals vote diﬀerently because they
have diﬀerent beliefs about the market return to eﬀort.
The second strand of literature consists of econometric investigations of survey
data on attitudes toward governmental redistribution of income. It includes papers
by Fong (2001), Corneo and Grüner (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Those
studies show that individuals’ beliefs about how fair market outcomes are contribute
signiﬁcantly to explaining their demands for governmental redistribution. As argued
by Corneo (2001), concerns with desert may be aﬀected by cultural factors and their
intensity varies across countries. The probit regressions presented in this paper belong
to the same family as those in that literature.
Finally, our paper is related to empirical investigations on how people think about
distributive justice and earnings inequality. As documented by Schokkaert (1998), a
large body of empirical research on opinions of distributive justice, mainly comingWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 7
from sociology and psychology, delivers little support to a welfarist notion of justice.
Rather, in judgements about macro-justice, the desert criterion is found to play a
crucial role. Osberg and Smeeding (2006) compare attitudes in various countries to-
ward what individuals in speciﬁc occupations ”do earn” and what they ”should earn”.
They stress that even within nations people do not all agree about what constitutes
a fair distribution of income. The ﬁndings in the current paper support the idea
that judgements about distributive justice are based on heterogeneous criteria. Inter-
estingly, Osberg and Smeeding ﬁnd more polarization in attitudes toward inequality
among Americans than in other countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe our econo-
metric model. Sect. 3 discusses our data and measures and Sect. 4 presents our
estimation results. In Sect. 5 we show how the model can be generalized to hetero-
geneous preferences and estimate the generalized model. Sect. 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical framework and empirical strategy
Individuals derive utility from the consumption of a numeraire good, C,a n df r o mt h e
perception of a just distribution of income, J. All other determinants of utility being
held constant, we assume that perceiving the income distribution as unjust rather
than just decreases an individual’s utility. Let us assume that utility is cardinally
measurable and unit comparable and takes the formWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 8
U = αlogC + βJ, (1)
where α and β are nonnegative scalars. The variable J ∈ {−1,1} takes the value
1 if the individual thinks that the allocation of resources in society is just and -1
otherwise. Thus, 2β represents the utility gain for the individual if she feels that
justice is realized. Let W denote the willingness to pay for justice, i.e. the maximal
amount an individual is willing to sacriﬁce in order to establish a just society. It is
implicitly deﬁned by
αlog(C − W)+β = αlogC − β.















disposable income to obtain justice.1
1The willingness to accept injustice, i.e. the minimal amount an individual requires in order to










In the ﬁrst version of this paper (Corneo and Fong, 2005), we assumed that utility linearly increases
with disposable income. In that framework, the willingness to pay for justice does not depend on
income and equals the willingness to accept injustice. While that assumption is not palatable, the
resulting model imposes less requirements on the ﬁscal data needed for gauging the value of justice.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 9
The existence or lack of distributive justice is related to two factors: the fairness
of market outcomes, f, and the governmental redistribution of incomes, R.L e tf be
1 if market incomes are perceived to be fair and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let R be 1 if
the government redistributes income and 0 otherwise. Justice is assumed to be done
if either market outcomes are fair and government does not redistribute or market
outcomes are unfair and governmental redistribution occurs:
J =1⇔ {f 6= R}
J = −1 ⇔ {f = R}.
Using these relationships, we can express utility as a function of f and R.N a m e l y ,
an agent’s utility may be written as
UR = αlogCR + β(1 − 2f)
under R =1and as
UN = αlogCN + β(2f − 1)
under R =0 . In this formulation, CR and CN respectively denote consumption with
The aggregate value of justice estimated according to that model is somewhat larger than the one
estimated in the model of the current paper.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 10
and without redistribution. Equivalence with (1) can easily be checked using the
above deﬁnition of justice. By way of an example, suppose that market outcomes
are unfair: f =0 . If there is no governmental redistribution of income, R =0 ;
then, J = −1.S i n c e U = UN if R =0 ,w eo b t a i nβJ = −β. The three remaining
cases can be checked in a similar fashion. Notice that W measures the willingness to
pay for distributional justice, not for governmental redistribution. The two notions
only coincide if one thinks that market outcomes are unfair. The theoretical model
is closed by the assumption that individuals support governmental redistribution of
income if and only if they achieve higher utility under redistribution.
In order to bring the theoretical framework to the data, we express it in terms of
a random utility model. Let utility in the case of redistribution be given by
UR = αlogCR + β(1 − 2f)+x
0γR + εR (3)
and utility in the case of absence of any redistribution be given by
UN = αlogCN + β(2f − 1) + x
0γN + εN. (4)
In the above equations, x is a vector of observable individual characteristics, the ﬁrst
element of which is normalized to 1. εR and εN represent the error terms.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 11
Preferences aﬀect attitudes according to
Pr[d =1 |CN,C R,f,x]=P r [ UR >U N], (5)
where d is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual supports governmental
redistribution of income and 0 otherwise.
Let y denote the individual’s market income. In the absence of redistribution,
market income and consumption coincide, i.e. CN = y. In the presence of redistrib-
ution, consumption depends on the functional form of the redistributive scheme. We
consider two models of governmental redistribution: a linear scheme and one with
constant progressivity.
2.1. Linear redistribution. Assume that CR = y(1−t)+z,w h e r et and z are the
parameters of an aﬃne redistributive system. According to some empirical studies,
e.g. Roemer et al. (2003), actual systems of redistribution are described rather well
by aﬃneness.
Inserting the above deﬁnitions of CN and CR in (3) and (4), and substituting the
resulting equations into (5), one obtains
Pr[d =1 |y,f,x]=P r [ αlog(1 − t + z/y)+β(2 − 4f)+x
0γ + ε > 0|y,f,x], (6)What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 12
where ε = εR − εN and γ = γR − γN.2
The relationship (6) can be estimated as a binary probit model. Let b bf = σbf
and b ay = σay be the estimates of the coeﬃcients on f a n do nt h ei n c o m e - d e p e n d e n t
variable log(1−t+z/y), respectively, where bf and ay a r ep r o b i te s t i m a t e sa n dσ is






















which is the formula for quantifying the value of distributive justice under an aﬃne
2If one assumes that γR = γN,t h e nx0γ drops out of the empirical model and attitudes towards
redistribution are completely determined by pecuniary incentives and a desire for distributive justice.
3To obtain the probit model, one assumes that the distribution of the error is a standard normal
and thus σ =1 . Since in general the variance of the error term cannot be identiﬁed, only the ratio
of the coeﬃcient to σ is identiﬁed.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 13
redistributive scheme.










The smaller r, the more progressive is governmental redistribution of income.
Inserting the above deﬁnitions of CN and CR in (3) and (4), and substituting the
resulting equations into (5), one obtains
Pr[d =1 |y,f,x]=P r [ αlog(s)+(r−1)αlog(y)+β(2−4f)+x
0γ+ε > 0|y,f,x]. (8)
Again, this relationship can be estimated as a binary probit model. Let b Bf = σBf
and b Ay = σAy be the estimates of the coeﬃcients on f and log(y), respectively, where
Bf and Ay are probit estimates and σ is the variance of the error term of the probit
equation.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 14
Note that




















which is the formula for quantifying the value of distributive justice under a redis-
tributive scheme with constant progressivity.
3. Data and measures
The assumptions of the model impose certain requirements on the data. First, the
model calls for a measure of pre-tax and pre-transfer income. Second, it calls for a
measure of absolute support for and opposition to redistribution rather than support
for more or less redistribution relative to the status quo. Third, it calls for a measure
that asks about a general redistributive policy that can achieve justice for society as a
whole. Widely available questions that ask about attitudes to “welfare” or “helpingWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 15
the poor” may be inappropriate because they might be interpreted as asking about
small means-tested programs such as TANF or the former AFDC in the United States.
These programs may help the poor without having much ﬁnancial impact on those
who never expect to qualify for beneﬁts, because the relatively small costs of the
program are shared by many taxpayers.
An additional concern is to avoid using “target-speciﬁc” beliefs about the fairness
of market incomes. When a redistributive policy targets a speciﬁc group of people,
beliefs about the causes of income for that speciﬁc group - referred to as target-speciﬁc
beliefs - have much larger eﬀects on support for that policy than beliefs about the
causes of income for people who are not in the target-group (Fong, 2005).
Finally, the publicly available social surveys tend to contain many “double-barreled”
questions - namely, questions that ask about more than one concept at a time. While
it is diﬃcult to avoid double-barreled questions altogether, it is important to avoid
those that would introduce serious confounds into the analysis.4
3.1. Data. With these considerations in mind, the best data set for our purposes
turns out to be the Gallup Organization 1998 Social Audit titled “Haves and Have-
Nots” (Gallup Organization, 1998). It is a national sample of the United States
containing 5001 respondents of the ages 18 years and older. The data set over-
4For example, there was a question that simultaneously asked about whether or not the dis-
tribution of income is fair and whether or not it should be more equal, thus relating to both our
dependent and independent measures. This question is clearly inappropriate.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 16
samples the poor, so we use sample weights to make it nationally representative.
H o w e v e r ,t h es a m p l ew e i g h t sh a v el i t t l ee ﬀect on our estimates.
3.2. Measures. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix present summary statistics
and the exact wording of the attitudinal measures used in our analysis. Our dependent
measure of demand for governmental redistribution is a binary variable that asks
w h e t h e ro rn o t“our government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the
rich”. There are two responses to this question - “should” and “should not” - plus
“don’t know”. Out of the whole nationally representative sample, 44.69 percent said
the government should redistribute, 51.52 percent said “should not”, and 3.79 percent
said “don’t know” or did not respond.5 We code the responses so that support for
redistribution is one and opposition to redistribution is zero.6
While none of the potential dependent measures in the data sets we searched
were perfect, this question is one of the best because it asks about support for gen-
eral redistribution of wealth - suggesting a large program that is likely to have a
substantial ﬁnancial impact on much of the population, rather than a small program
that concentrates its ﬁnancial impact on the poor. However, the question also de-
scribes a program that targets the rich more than the poor, so we are careful to
avoid regressing our dependent measure on target-speciﬁc beliefs about the causes of
5Throughout this section we report nationally representative weighted proportions. The un-
weighted proportions are virtually the same as the weighted proportions.
6We code “don’t know” as missing, because our model addresses the population of people who
know their preferences.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 17
wealth.
Beliefs about the fairness of market outcomes are recovered from two survey ques-
tions about the roles of eﬀort and circumstances beyond individual control in causing,
respectively, poverty and wealth. These questions have nearly identical wording and
response scales. The one about causes of poverty is: “Just your opinion, which is more
often to blame if a person is poor — lack of eﬀort on his or her part, or circumstances
beyond his or her control? 1) Lack of eﬀort 2) Luck or circumstances beyond his/her
control, 3) Both, 4) Don’t know.” We refer to this question as WHYPOOR. Out of
the whole nationally representative weighted sample, 42.80 percent said lack of eﬀort
explained why people are poor, 40.59 percent said “luck or circumstances”, 13.95
percent said “both”, and 2.66 percent said they “don’t know” or did not respond.
The question about causes of wealth is: “Just your opinion, which is more of-
ten to blame if a person is rich —strong eﬀort to succeed on his or her part, or luck
or circumstances beyond his or her control? 1) Strong eﬀort 2) Luck or circum-
stances beyond his/her control 3) Both, 4) Don’t know.” We refer to this question
as WHYRICH. Out of the whole nationally representative weighted sample, 53.22
percent said strong eﬀort explained why people are rich, 31.89 percent said “luck or
circumstances”, 11.34 percent said “both”, and 3.56 percent said they “don’t know”
or did not respond.
Our theoretical model posits people with beliefs that are both “strong” and “gen-What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 18
eral”. By strong beliefs, we mean certain beliefs that either eﬀort matters (i.e. that
market outcomes are fair) or that luck matters (i.e. that market outcomes are unfair).
By general beliefs, we mean beliefs that the causes of income are the same for every-
one. Therefore, when estimating the value of justice, we merely use the sub-sample of
respondents who had strong and general beliefs - that is, those who either said that
lack of eﬀort causes poverty and strong eﬀort causes wealth or that bad luck causes
poverty and good luck causes wealth.
While this way of estimating the value of justice closely follows the theoretical
model, it leads us to neglect a considerable amount of information, as about half of
our sample does not consist of respondents with strong and general beliefs. Hence, we
also investigate a second set of regressions using a diﬀerent measure of beliefs about
fairness that is available for over 97 percent of the sample. This measure and the
resulting estimates are presented in Appendix A.
As a proxy for market income, we employ annual pre-tax, pre-transfer household
income. Income was measured in nine categories. We specify it as a single measure
by representing each category with an estimate of the median income of the people
in that category. We obtain the category medians for income levels up to $100,000
from the concurrent March Supplement to the Current Population Survey.7 For
7For each income category in the Gallup survey, there is a set of smaller income categories in the
CPS. For each Gallup income category, we use the CPS income category cutoﬀ p o i n tt h a ti sc l o s e s t
to the 50th percentile.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 19
income levels greater than $100,000, we estimate the category median using data on
the distribution of income up to $250,000 or more from the 2000 Current Population
Survey.8
When estimating model (6), we need numerical values for the parameters of the
redistributive scheme, t and z. Our dependent variable asks whether the government
should redistribute, without specifying the extent of redistribution. Since redistribu-
tion does occur in the United States, a natural interpretation of the survey question
is whether the government should keep redistributing at its actual level. Under this
interpretation, the t and z of our theoretical model are the actual ones. Alternatively,
the extent of redistribution conjectured by respondents might have been larger than
the actual level. However, since we do not know what that conjecture could have
possibly been, we stick to the ﬁrst interpretation and look for parameters that depict
the actual system of redistribution as precisely as possible.
To the best of our knowledge, the latest attempt to calibrate the US redistributive
scheme as a linear one is Roemer et al. (2003). We adopt the results of that study
for our estimation, with some minor adjustments for changes in public expenditures
from 1991 to 1998. Accordingly, we posit t =0 .243 and z =5 ,249.9
8See Table HINC-07 of the Detailed Household Income Tables: 2000, from the 2001 Current
Population Survey March Supplement release.
9Roemer et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the lump-sum transfer is 2,036 USD. Their estimation refers
to transfer per adult in 1991. Our estimation is obtained by multiplying 2,036 by the average
number of adults per household and by the nominal growth factor of public expenditure in the
period 1991-1998.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 20
The structural estimation of the theoretical model employs only an income-dependent
variable and beliefs about the fairness of market incomes as regressors. In order to
check the robustness of our results, we also run regressions with control variables.
Including a large number of controls has advantages and disadvantages. The main
advantage is that it helps address concerns about potential missing variables biases
in the coeﬃcient on beliefs about fairness of market incomes. More speciﬁcally, in-
cluding a large number of proxies for current and expected future ﬁnancial security
helps address concerns that the means and variances of current and expected future
income may be correlated with beliefs that market incomes are fair and may bias
the coeﬃcient on beliefs upward if they are missing or poorly measured. The main
disadvantage of including a large number of proxies for ﬁnancial security is that it
introduces multicollinearity with current income and makes it diﬃcult to estimate
the coeﬃcient on income.
To assess this trade-oﬀ, we examine the sensitivity of the coeﬃcients on the belief
about fairness and on income to speciﬁcation changes. Along with a structural speciﬁ-
cation that includes only the beliefs measure and income, we present an intermediate
speciﬁcation that controls for age, age squared, four age-group dummies, a dummy
for being white, a dummy for being male, the interaction between the dummies for
white and male, ﬁve education dummies, a dummy for being married, a dummy for
having one or more dependent children under the age of 18 in the household, andWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 21
d u m m i e sf o rl i v i n gi nas u b u r b a na r e ao rar u r a la r e a( a so p p o s e dt oa nu r b a na r e a ) ;
and a full speciﬁcation that includes additional objective and subjective indicators of
socioeconomic position and ﬁnancial security. These additional controls are: seventy-
ﬁve occupation dummies, a dummy for being a union member, dummies for being
employed part-time and being unemployed (as opposed to being employed full-time),
a dummy for owning a home, the value of the household’s non-home assets (ten dum-
mies), subjective worries about paying bills (three dummies), and three dummies for
having had too little money in the past year to pay for, respectively, medical bills,
food, and clothing. The Gallup data set does not include geographical variables (e.g.,
state of residence). However, the detailed information about occupation, employ-
ment status, population density of residence (i.e., rural, suburban or urban), union
membership, and so on, control for many of the economic diﬀerences between people
living in diﬀerent states.
4. Baseline Results
Tables 1 and 2 present the probit results using the measure of beliefs about market
fairness constructed from WHYPOOR and WHYRICH. They are based on the sub-
sample of respondents who had strong and general beliefs about the causes of poverty
- namely, those who replied either that eﬀort levels cause both poverty and wealth or
that luck or circumstances cause both poverty and wealth. Columns 1, 2 and 3 in
each table present, respectively, the structural, intermediate, and full speciﬁcations.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 22
Table 1 reports estimates based on model (6), i.e. a linear redistributive scheme;
Table 2 refers to the constant progressivity redistributive scheme posited in model
(8). In Appendix A, we report the corresponding ﬁndings for probit equations using
our alternative measure of beliefs and a much larger sample. As it turns out, the
results are not aﬀected very much by the change in the beliefs measure and sample
size.
[PLEASE INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
As shown by Table 1, the belief that eﬀort causes wealth and poverty - compared
to the omitted category of believing that luck or circumstances cause wealth and
poverty - has a negative and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on support for redistribution
in every speciﬁcation. The table shows that the coeﬃcient on the belief measure
is virtually unaﬀected by speciﬁcation changes. When we move from the structural
speciﬁcation to the intermediate speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on the belief about mar-
ket fairness stays roughly the same, changing from -0.81 to -0.82. When moving from
t h ei n t e r m e d i a t et ot h ef u l ls p e c i ﬁcation the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on beliefs
again stays roughly the same, decreasing to -0.80.
The transformed income variable also has a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on support for
redistribution in every speciﬁcation. The transformed variable is inversely related
to income, so income itself has a negative eﬀect on support for redistribution, asWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 23
expected. However, the coeﬃcient on transformed income is quite sensitive to speci-
ﬁcation changes. Moving from the structural to the intermediate speciﬁcation reduces
the magnitude of the coeﬃcient by 33 percent. Moving from the intermediate to the
full speciﬁcation reduces the magnitude of the coeﬃcient by 41 percent. Thus, for
the purpose of estimating the coeﬃcient on transformed income, the common practice
of including as many control variables as possible is clearly inappropriate.
The results are similar in the case of nonlinear redistribution, as shown by Table
2. The coeﬃcients on the beliefs about market fairness are virtually the same as in
Table 1, ranging from -0.80 in columns 1 and 3 to -0.812 in column 2. The coeﬃcient
on the log of income has a highly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in columns 1 and 2, and a
marginally signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in column 3. However, the coeﬃcient on the log
of income is very sensitive to the speciﬁcation. When we move from the structural
speciﬁcation to the intermediate speciﬁcation, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient falls
by 28 percent. When we move from the intermediate to the full speciﬁcation, the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient falls by 41 percent. Given these ﬁndings, the full
speciﬁcation is clearly inappropriate. Below, we use the structural speciﬁcation to
calculate our baseline estimates of the value of justice. As we will explain, the
structural speciﬁcation yields the most conservative estimates of the value of justice.
Baseline estimates of the value of justice. The value of distributive justice
is given by Equation (2). Accordingly, individuals’ valuations of distributive justiceWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 24
equal a fraction j =1− exp(−2β/α) of their disposable income. We now quantify
that fraction under the two redistributive schemes posited above.
Linear redistribution. Table 1 gives us estimates of bf and ay for a household
with strong general beliefs. Substituting the estimates of bf, ay from column 1 of
Table 1 into formula (7), one obtains an estimated value of j = .270.
This means the following: On average, a US household with strong general beliefs
about market fairness - which characterizes about half of US households - is willing
to pay up to 27 percent of its disposable income to live in a just society. Positing that
total disposable income of private households makes up 2/3 of GDP, the aggregate
willingness to pay for justice equals 18 percent of US GDP.
The above computations extrapolate from the results based on the sub-sample
containing respondents who had strong beliefs. According to our data, that sub-
sample represents 48.26 percent of the households in the United States. The remaining
51.74 percent of the sample had weak and/or speciﬁc beliefs. Our theoretical model
does not make predictions for these individuals. Ap r i o r i , there seems to be nothing
wrong in positing that these individuals have the same willingness to pay for justice
as those in the other group. Preferences for justice have no evident relationship to
beliefs about the fairness of market outcomes. These beliefs should be related to
(indirect) preferences for governmental redistribution, not to (direct) preferences for
justice.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 25
Constant progressivity. Table 2 displays estimates of Bf and Ay produced
by assuming that the tax-transfer system has a constant coeﬃcient of residual pro-
gression. As indicated by (9), in order to estimate j one needs an estimate of the
coeﬃcient of residual progression, r. OECD (2005) presents estimates of that coeﬃ-
cient for several countries, including the US. The OECD estimates are not ideal for
our purposes because they refer to wage earners only and to the year 2004. However,
they are the best we could ﬁnd. Based on that study, we posit that r =0 .85.10
Substituting the estimates of Bf and Ay from column 1 of Table 2 as well as
r =0 .85 into formula (9), one obtains an estimated value of j = .176. This number
is reasonably close to the one obtained using the linear redistributive scheme in the
sense that though smaller, it is still substantial.
Clearly, a willingness to pay for distributive justice of the order of 20 percent of
disposable income is large.11 This is not an artifact of using the structural speciﬁ-
cation to recover the coeﬃcients for computing W/C. Using the intermediate or the
full speciﬁcation (i.e. columns 2 and 3 in Tables 1 and 2) would produce even larger
estimates. This is due to the fact that, according to (7) and (9), the value of distrib-
10See Table II.19 in OECD (2005). Accordingly, the coeﬃcient of residual progression varies to
some extent across households with diﬀerent socio-economic composition. The value r =0 .85 is
found for married couples with two children, where one member of the couple earns the average
wage and the other member earns 67 % of the average wage. The coeﬃcient of residual progression
is found to be somewhat larger for households without children and somewhat lower for households
with lower income.
11Interestingly, results from experimental dictator games point to similar orders of magnitude. In
anonymous settings, dictators are willing to give up about 20% of the monetary payoﬀ to the other
player. In real US society, tips of 20% are not uncommon, e.g. in restaurants and for taxies.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 26
utive justice is proportional to the ratio of the coeﬃcient of the beliefs variable to the
coeﬃcient of the income-dependent variable. Including control variables leaves the
value of the coeﬃcient on the beliefs variable almost unchanged while it decreases the
value of the coeﬃcient on the income-dependent variable, in absolute terms. Hence,
t h ee s t i m a t eo fj increases when control variables are included.
5. Estimating the value of justice for different types
So far, our empirical investigation indicates that in the US there is a sizeable willing-
ness to pay for living in a just society on average. We now ask whether this average
magnitude mirrors homogeneous tastes or results from the aggregation of diﬀerent
tastes. Formally, we relax the assumption that individuals have the same utility func-
tion and empirically test whether diﬀerent types within the population have diﬀerent
preferences for distributive justice.
5.1. Model. We extend the theoretical model of demand for redistribution of
Sect. 2 as follows. Let individuals be described by a collection of dichotomous traits
k =1 ,2,...K.V a r i a b l eTk ∈ {0,1} takes value 1 if and only if the individual has trait
k. An individual’s type is a vector of traits (T1,...T K). Types are assumed to aﬀect
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where Ψ is a constant and δk, k =1 ,2,...K,c a p t u r e st h ee ﬀect of having the corre-
sponding trait k.
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of disposable income. Denote by jk the amount by which that fraction changes as a





















Notice that the willingness to pay induced by having a trait depends on the other
traits of the individual. Provided that 2Ψ/α > 0,t r a i tk increases the willingness to
pay for justice, i.e. jk > 0, if and only if δk > 0.
The method of gauging the trait-speciﬁc preferences δk depends on the redistrib-
utive scheme.
Case CR = y(1 − t)+z:
Inserting (10) into (6) one obtainsWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 28
















Notice that the vector x0 may possibly include some or all the trait variables Tk,i . e .
a trait may be associated with both a special taste for justice and an independent
eﬀect on the demand for redistribution.
Analogously to the model with identical preferences of Sect. 2, model (??)c a n
be estimated by probit methods. Let b bf = σbf and b ay = σay be the estimates of
the coeﬃcients on f and log
³
1 − t + z
y
´
, respectively, where bf and ay are probit
estimates and σ is the (unknown) variance of the error term of the probit equation.
Let b bkf = σbkf be the estimate of the coeﬃcient on fTk.F r o m −4Ψ = σbf and
−4Ψδk = σbkf, one obtains the crucial parameter for gauging the willingness to pay
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which completes the data required in order to compute (11).
Case CR = sCr
N:
From (8) we obtain
Pr[d =1 |y,f,x]=P r
"




0γ + ε > 0|y,f,x
(13)
Let b Bf = σBf and b Ay = σAy be the estimates of the coeﬃcients on f and log(y),
respectively, where Bf and Ay a r ep r o b i te s t i m a t e sa n dσ is the variance of the error
term of the probit equation. Let b Bkf = σBkf be the estimate of the coeﬃcient on












Hence, estimating the speciﬁc willingness to pay of a type merely requires regress-
ing support for redistribution on a transformed income variable, a belief dummy, trait
dummies, and the interactions between the belief and trait dummies. Having a givenWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 30
trait increases the relative willingness to pay for justice if and only if the estimated
coeﬃcients on the belief variable and the term interacting that particular trait have
t h es a m es i g n .
5.2. Results. Bringing this theoretical framework to the data ideally requires
employing characteristics of respondents that are exogenous and uncorrelated with
the key regressors beliefs and transformed income,s oa st op r o d u c er e l i a b l ec o e ﬃcient
estimates. In practice, these conditions may be hard to fulﬁll. With this caveat in
mind, we produce rough estimates of the value of justice for diﬀerent types. We
present these estimates for traits that meet a minimal robustness requirement. More
speciﬁcally, we require the interaction between the trait and the beliefs dummy - which
is necessary for deducing δk - to be statistically signiﬁcant in two speciﬁcations. The
ﬁrst speciﬁcation adds the trait and the interaction term to the structural model
that was presented in the ﬁrst column of Tables 1 and 2. For each trait that had
as i g n i ﬁcant interaction in this speciﬁcation, we include it and its interaction, along
with transformed income and the beliefs dummy, in a larger speciﬁcation. We check
that the interaction terms for each trait are also signiﬁcant in this larger speciﬁcation.
Traits of the respondents that survive this selection procedure, i.e. have interaction
terms that are statistically signiﬁcant in both speciﬁcations, are considered to be
associated with a distinctive taste for justice.
The traits of respondents that we tested using this method are the socio-demographicWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 31
variables included in the intermediate speciﬁcation that was presented in the second
column of Tables 1 and 2. We collapsed age to a dummy for 40 years of age and
older and education to a dummy for some college or more.
When we employ this selection procedure, we identify two traits that are associ-
ated with a distinctive taste for justice, namely race and education. The dummies for
w h i t ea n ds o m ec o l l e g eo rm o r ea r et h eo n l yo n e st os y s t e m a t i c a l l yh a v es i g n i ﬁcant
interactions at the ﬁve-percent level or better. This is true for both the linear and
non-linear redistribution schemes.
Table 3 presents the larger speciﬁcation that adds those two traits and their
interactions with beliefs to the structural speciﬁcation. Column 1 presents the results
for the linear redistribution scheme, while column 2 presents the results for the scheme
with constant progressivity. The table shows that the dummies for white and some
college have signiﬁcant interactions with the beliefs dummy in both redistribution
schemes. As the coeﬃcient on the belief variable has the expected negative sign, a
trait increases the relative willingness to pay for justice if its interaction with the
beliefs variable has a negative coeﬃcient, and it decreases that willingness to pay if
the coeﬃcient is positive. Hence, both being white and having some higher education
increase the relative willingness to pay for justice. We interpret this ﬁnding shortly.
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The two traits associated with a distinctive taste for justice can be combined
so as to deﬁne four diﬀerent types. Using Equation (11), we calculate the value
of justice for each of these types. These results are presented in Table 4. Under
both redistributive schemes, the strongest preference for justice is associated with
white respondents who have at least some college education; the willingness to pay
of this type amounts to 41 percent of disposable income under the linear scheme and
to nearly 28 percent under constant progressivity. The type with the lowest relative
willingness to pay is a non-white respondent without college education; its willingness
to pay equals 12 percent of disposable income under the linear scheme and less than
8 percent under constant progressivity. As the results in Table 4 clearly indicate, the
concern for distributive justice is strongly aﬀected by race and education.
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
We now come to an interpretation of the ﬁnding that white respondents with some
higher education exhibit a distinctively large relative willingness to pay for justice.
A skeptic might point out that our estimation results might potentially be driven by
a misspeciﬁcation of the utility function: while we assumed that distributive justice
is a normal good, it might be a luxury good. The eﬀe c tt h a tw ed o c u m e n t e da b o v e
might thus reﬂect higher incomes on the part of white, educated individuals rather
than a distinctive taste for justice.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 33
In order to scrutinize that conjecture, we have estimated a model based on the
assumption that justice is a luxury good. That theoretical model and its estimation
are presented in Appendix 2. Contrary to the above conjecture, we ﬁnd similar results
if we posit that justice is a luxury good. So, while it could be the case that the size
of the diﬀerences in willingness to pay across types would be smaller than suggested
by Table 4 if justice were a luxury, the conclusion that educated white individuals
display a stronger concern for justice remains valid.
In order to interpret our ﬁndings, recall that distributive justice was deﬁned at the
outset as distribution according to desert. While we have supposed that everybody
views justice in that way, some individuals might instead evaluate the fairness of the
income distribution according to the justice principles of need or simple equality. Our
results suggest that those individuals are likely to be non-educated and non-white.
Respondents who are educated might put special emphasis on distribution accord-
ing to desert because they have already expended much eﬀort in order to increase
their human capital and want to reap the gains from their investment. Respondents
who are white might display a special taste for distribution according to eﬀort because
accumulating human capital and selling its services might be less costly for them than
for some minority groups. Members of minorities who set out to accumulate human
capital might have a hard time because they live in communities where group norms
discourage one from achievement in school and the workplace. Furthermore, for mi-What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 34
nority members who succeed in terms of formal education, selling their services to
employers may entail costly signalling in order to overcome negative stereotypes.12
5.3. The respective role of preferences, beliefs and income. The theoret-
ical model that we have brought to the data in this section has individual attitudes
towards governmental redistribution of income determined by pre-ﬁsc income, beliefs
about the fairness of market outcomes and type-speciﬁc tastes for distributive jus-
tice. Which factor is the most important determinant of support for and opposition
to redistribution?
In order to address this issue, we compute predicted probabilities of support for
redistribution on the basis of the probit regressions presented in Table 3. We con-
sider sixteen hypothetical respondents that can be obtained by combining the three
dummy variables - namely beliefs about market fairness, white, and some college or
more - and two income levels, namely median income and ﬁve times the median in-
come. The associated predicted probabilities, under both the linear and the nonlinear
redistribution scheme, are shown in Table 5.
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
As shown by Table 5, beliefs are a much more powerful motive for support for
12See Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Corneo and Jeanne (2007) for recent theoretical work on
the management of beliefs and t h ec h o i c eo fv a l u es y s t e m s .What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 35
redistribution than pre-ﬁsc income. Taking the unweighted average over all hypothet-
ical respondents that believe the market is unfair under both redistribution schemes,
shows that the predicted probability of supporting redistribution is almost 58 percent.
The corresponding average probability of supporting redistribution for those who be-
lieve that the market is fair is just 32 percent. Hence, a switch in beliefs leads to a
twenty-six percentage point change in the probability of supporting redistribution.
The pecuniary eﬀect is much smaller. The average probability of supporting redis-
t r i b u t i o nf o rs o m e o n ew i t hm e d i a np r e - ﬁsc income is almost 50 percent. Multiplying
that income by ﬁve merely diminishes that probability by less than ten percentage
points. Hence, even a very large income diﬀerence makes only a moderate diﬀerence
in support for governmental redistribution.
The maximal diﬀerence in the taste for justice - i.e. for distribution according
to desert - obtains if one compares white respondents with some college or more
to non-white respondents without college education. The former respondents have
a much higher relative willingness to pay for justice than the latter. Taking the
unweighted average of the predicted probabilities of supporting redistribution for the
ﬁrst group shows that white respondents with some higher education are in favor of
redistribution with a probability of about 38 percent. The corresponding probability
for non-white respondents without higher education amounts to about 52 percent.
Therefore, even the maximal diﬀerence in tastes for justice produces a substantiallyWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 36
smaller diﬀerence in attitudes towards redistribution compared to what is triggered
by a diﬀerence in beliefs of market fairness.13
6. Conclusion
This paper developed a simple theoretical model that can be empirically implemented
to estimate the monetary value of distributive justice, deﬁned as distribution accord-
ing to desert, and to uncover group-speciﬁc preferences for it. As an application, we
have estimated the value of distributive justice in the United States.
Our empirical exercise has delivered several insights into the concerns for distrib-
utive justice and the factors that drive demand for income redistribution. First, our
estimates indicate that the willingness to pay for distributive justice in the United
States is substantial. While our reference estimate of about 20 percent of disposable
income may be exaggerated by data problems and a strongly simpliﬁed theoretical
framework, our analysis clearly supports the claim that people’s concern for justice
is one that is sizeable in monetary terms. This is one more reason, and a speciﬁcally
economic one, why economists should be interested in distributive justice.
Second, preferences for a just distribution are not homogeneous: a cleavage along
the lines of race and education seems to exist in the US. We have found that white
13According to the model estimated in this section, if a respondent believes that the market is fair,
being white and having some college education increase opposition to governmental redistribution.
Therefore, a stronger concern for justice appears to diminish the probability of supporting govern-
mental redistribution. Notice that in the sample used for our regressions, about 60 % of respondents
believe that the market is fair, i.e. that being poor is caused by lack of eﬀort and being rich is
caused by strong eﬀort.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 37
individuals with some higher education have a markedly larger willingness to pay for
it than the rest of the population. This diﬀerence is not due to distributive justice
being a luxury good, but reﬂects diﬀerent tastes. We have conjectured that non-
educated minorities may subscribe to a diﬀerent notion of distributive justice, one
that stresses needs and simple equality more and desert less than the one endorsed
by the educated white.
Third, demand for governmental reduction of income inequality is driven by pre-
ﬁsc income, beliefs in the fairness of the market system, and preferences for distrib-
utive justice to diﬀerent extents. We have computed how predicted probabilities of
supporting redistribution respond to those three determinants and found that the
factor that drives demand for redistribution in the US most is the belief that market
outcomes are driven by luck or circumstances beyond one’s control rather than one’s
eﬀort.
Our estimates should be interpreted with caution. The theoretical model on
which they are based is a very stylized one, which deﬁnes distributive justice as a
dichotomous variable. While this is an acceptable ﬁrst step, in reality perceptions of
distributive justice are more like a continuous variable. Extending the current model
to account for such perceptions would be worthwhile. With respect to the empirical
measures of attitudes and beliefs, those available were far from ideal. It would be very
helpful to have survey questions that are less vulnerable to multiple interpretationsWhat’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 38
and allow for a ﬁner grid of measurement.
We have put forward the conjecture that endorsed notions of distributive justice
might be heterogeneous: some subgroups might place a distinctive emphasis on needs
and simple equality, rather than desert. A next step in this line of research would
be to scrutinize that conjecture, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Maybe,
a method could be developed to estimate the willingness to pay for an egalitarian or
needs-based income distribution.
Finally, a fascinating task would be to bring the approach developed in this paper
to an international data set. One would be interested in assessing how the relative
willingness to pay for distributive justice varies across countries and which notions of
justice are associated with diﬀerent cultures. We leave this task to future research.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 39
[PLEASE INSERT TABLES A1 AND A2 ABOUT HERE]
Appendix A: E s t i m a t e so ft h eb a s i cm o d e lu s i n ga na l t e r n a t i v em e a s u r eo fb e l i e f s
I no u rm a i na n a l y s i sp r e s e n t e da b o v ew eu s eam e a s u r eo fb e l i e f st h a tw a sa v a i l a b l e
for only about half of the sample. In this appendix, we replicate the analysis using
ad i ﬀerent measure of beliefs that is available for the vast majority of respondents.
This second measure of beliefs is the following survey question: “Do you think the
economic system in the United States is (read and rotate 1-2)? 1) Basically fair, since
all Americans have an equal opportunity to succeed OR 2) Basically unfair, since all
Americans do not have an equal opportunity to succeed 3) Don’t know.” We refer
to this measure as ECONFAIR. Out of the whole nationally representative sample,
68.00 percent of the respondents said the economic system is “basically fair”, 29.41
percent said “basically unfair”, and only 2.59 percent said “don’t know” or did not
respond. We code “basically unfair” as zero and “basically fair” as one. While this
m e a s u r eh a st h ea d v a n t a g eo fb e i n ga v a i l a b l ef o ro v e r9 7p e r c e n to fo u rs a m p l e ,i th a s
the disadvantage of being more ambiguous. While we would like to know whether
or not respondents believe the market system to be fair, ECONFAIR asks about the
fairness of the economic system.
Tables A3 and A4 replicate Tables 1 and 2, except that they use ECONFAIR
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the economic system is fair has a negative and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on support
for redistribution in every speciﬁcation. The table shows that the coeﬃcient on the
belief measure is not aﬀected very much by speciﬁcation changes. The transformed
income variable has a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on support for redistribution in the
structural and intermediate speciﬁcations presented in columns 1 and 2, but not in
the full speciﬁcation presented in column 3. The transformed variable is inversely re-
lated to income, so income itself has a negative eﬀect on support for redistribution, as
expected. However, the coeﬃcient on transformed income is quite sensitive to spec-
iﬁcation changes. Thus, for the purpose of estimating the coeﬃcient on transformed
income, the common practice of including as many control variables as possible is
clearly inappropriate. The results are similar in the case of nonlinear redistribution,
as shown by Table A4. The coeﬃcients on the beliefs about market fairness are
very similar to those in Table A3 and as before, are not sensitive to speciﬁcation
changes. The coeﬃcient on the log of income has a highly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
in columns 1 and 2, and a marginally signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in column 3. As be-
fore, the coeﬃcient on the log of income is very sensitive to the speciﬁcation. Given
these ﬁndings, the full speciﬁcation is clearly inappropriate.
[PLEASE INSERT TABLES A3 AND A4 ABOUT HERE]
Thus, as before, we use the structural speciﬁcation to calculate our baseline esti-What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 41
mates of the value of justice. In the case of linear redistribution, j = .260.I n t h e
case of redistribution with constant progressivity redistribution, j = .167.
Finally, we replicated Table 3 using ECONFAIR to measure beliefs about market
fairness instead of the measure constructed from WHYPOOR and WHYRICH (un-
reported). The interaction terms are in the same direction, although the interaction
between Some college or more and Belief that economic system is fair is not signiﬁ-
cant in either redistribution scheme (the p-values are roughly 0.2 in both cases). The
interaction between White and Belief that economic system is fair is again signiﬁcant
(at the ﬁve-percent level) in both redistribution schemes. Thus, while the evidence is
slightly weaker using ECONFAIR, we again ﬁnd heterogeneity in the value of justice
according to types.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 42
Appendix B: Model with heterogeneous preferences and justice as a luxury good
Assume a Stone-Geary formulation of the utility function,
U = αlog(C − m)+βJ,
where m>0 captures some minimal consumption level. The willingness to pay for
justice is implicitly deﬁned by
















Hence, the relative willingness to pay for justice increases with income.
Suppose that types aﬀect preferences according to (10). Under a linear redistrib-
utive scheme, we obtain
Pr[d =1 |y,f,x]=P r [ αlog
"
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Estimating this relationship requires one to choose a numerical value for m.I no r d e r
to avoid wasting observations, we set m equal to half of the minimal pre-ﬁsc income
observed in our data set. This amounts to m =3 ,750.14
Table A5 reports the results from estimating (14) using the traits white and some
college. Similarly to Table 3, both interaction terms are statistically signiﬁcant.
Hence, those two traits are found to be associated with a distinctive taste for justice
also under the assumption that justice is a luxury good.
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE A5 ABOUT HERE]
14If we assume a redistributive scheme with constant progressivity, i.e. CR = sCr
N,t h e
transformed-income variable entering the probit model entails the coeﬃcient s.S i n c e w e h a v e
no knowledge of that coeﬃcient, we cannot estimate the model under that redistributive scheme.What’s the Monetary Value of Distributive Justice? 44
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Table 1. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution assuming a linear redistributive 
scheme. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Belief that income is caused by   -0.811***  -0.823***  -0.800*** 
   effort  (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.071) 
Transformed  income  variable  1.290*** 0.860*** 0.511 
  (0.22) (0.26) (0.33) 
White   -0.051  -0.098 
   (0.11)  (0.12) 
Male   -0.103  -0.102 
   (0.15)  (0.16) 
White*male   -0.240  -0.290* 
   (0.16)  (0.17) 
Age   -0.011  -0.017 
   (0.025)  (0.027) 
Age squared    -5.6E-5  6.8E-6 
   (2.3E-4)  (2.4E-4) 
High school graduate    -0.040  0.043 
   (0.12)  (0.13) 
Technical, trade, or business     0.087  0.155 
  degree after high school    (0.17)  (0.18) 
Some college    -0.278**  -0.165 
   (0.12)  (0.13) 
College degree    -0.352***  -0.217 
   (0.13)  (0.15) 
Some post-graduate education     -0.322**  -0.162 
   or more    (0.13)  (0.15) 
Children under 18 living at home    -0.031  -0.097 
   (0.077)  (0.084) 
Married   -0.015  -0.005 
   (0.073)  (0.079) 
Suburban   -0.162**  -0.195** 
   (0.074)  (0.079) 
Rural   0.0262  -0.006 
   (0.088)  (0.095) 
Observations  2225 2190 2061 
Wald  chi-square  227.1 294.9 387.3 
Numbers shown are coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses).  *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, respectively.  All equations include a 
constant.  Equation in column 2 also includes four age group dummies.  Equation in column 3 
also includes four age group dummies, 75 occupation dummies, ten asset dummies, three 
dummies for not having had enough money to buy food clothing and medical care in the last year, 
three dummies for subjective financial worries and dummies for being unemployed, employed 
part-time, a home owner and a union member.   47
 
Table 2. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution assuming a redistributive scheme 
with constant progressivity. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Belief that income is caused by   -0.800***  -0.812***  -0.798*** 
   Effort  (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.072) 
Log income  -0.309***  -0.221***  -0.131* 
 (0.043)  (0.051)  (0.069) 
White   -0.045  -0.096 
   (0.11)  (0.12) 
Male   -0.100  -0.101 
   (0.15)  (0.16) 
White*male   -0.240  -0.293* 
   (0.16)  (0.17) 
Age   -0.012  -0.017 
   (0.025)  (0.027) 
Age squared    -5.0E-5  4.8E-6 
   (2.3E-4)  (2.4E-4) 
High school graduate    -0.032  0.043 
   (0.12)  (0.13) 
Technical, trade, or business     0.099  0.156 
  degree after high school    (0.17)  (0.18) 
Some college    -0.253**  -0.159 
   (0.12)  (0.13) 
College degree    -0.315**  -0.208 
   (0.13)  (0.15) 
Some post-graduate education     -0.263**  -0.149 
   or more    (0.13)  (0.15) 
Children under 18 living at     -0.032  -0.097 
   home    (0.077)  (0.084) 
Married   0.002  2.3E-4 
   (0.073)  (0.079) 
Suburban   -0.155**  -0.192** 
   (0.074)  (0.079) 
Rural   0.018  -0.010 
   (0.088)  (0.095) 
Observations 2225  2190  2061 
Wald chi-square  245.2  304.4  390.3 
See notes to Table 1.   48
 
Table 3. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution allowing for type-specific 
preferences in the linear and constant progressivity redistributive schemes. 








Transformed income variable  1.053***   
 (0.23)   
Log income    -0.256*** 
   (0.046) 
Belief that income is caused by effort  -0.278*  -0.271* 
 (0.15)  (0.15) 
White -0.029  -0.020 
 (0.12)  (0.12) 
Belief*white -0.410***  -0.408*** 
 (0.16)  (0.16) 
Some college or more  0.016  0.048 
 (0.099)  (0.100) 
Belief*some college or more  -0.424***  -0.426*** 
 (0.13)  (0.13) 
Observations 2203  2203 
Wald chi-square  292.6  301.8 
Numbers shown are coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses).  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, respectively.  Both 
equations include a constant. 
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Table 4.  Willingness to pay for justice as a fraction of disposable income for four types. 
 White Non-white 
 
PANEL A.  Linear redistribution scheme 
Some college or more  .410  .284 
No college  .279  .124 
    
PANEL B.  Constant progressivity redistribution scheme 
Some college or more  .277  .185 
No college  .181  .077 
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Table 5.  Predicted probabilities of supporting redistribution. 
  Believes market is fair  Believes market is unfair 
 White Non-white White Non-white 
        
PANEL A.  Individuals with median household income under linear redistribution scheme. 
Some college or more  .213  .360  .624    .635 
No college  .349  .520  .618      .629 
        
PANEL B.  Individuals with five times the median household income under linear redistribution 
scheme. 
Some college or more  .175  .311  .571  .582 
No college  .300  .466  .565  .576 
        
PANEL C.  Individuals with median household income under constant progressivity 
redistribution scheme 
Some college or more  .228  .376  .641  .648 
No college  .357  .524  .623  .630 
        
PANEL D.  Individuals with five times the median household income under constant 
progressivity redistribution scheme 
Some college or more  .124  .233  .480  .488 
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Table A1.  Exact wording of and responses to measures of dependent variable and beliefs about 
fairness of market outcomes. 
Dependent Variable: “People feel differently about how far a government should go.  Here is a 
phrase which some people believe in and some don’t.  Do you think our government should or 
should not redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich?”   
“Should” (44.69%)  
“Should not” (51.52%)  
“Don’t know “(2.93%)  
Non-response (0.86%) 
WHYPOOR: “Just your opinion, which is more often to blame if a person is poor – lack of 
effort on his or her part, or circumstances beyond his or her control?”  
“Luck or circumstances beyond his/her control” (40.59%)  
“Both” (13.95%)  
“Lack of effort” (42.80%)  
“Don’t know” (1.84%)  
Non-response (.82%) 
WHYRICH: “Just your opinion, which is more often to blame if a person is rich –strong effort 
to succeed on his or her part, or luck or circumstances beyond his or her control?” 
“Luck or circumstances beyond his/her control” (31.88%) 
“Both” (11.34%) 
“Strong effort” (53.22%) 
“Don’t know” (2.61%) 
Non-response (0.95%) 
ECONFAIR: "Do you think the economic system in the United States is (read and rotate 1-2)?”  
“1) Basically fair, since all Americans have an equal opportunity to succeed OR” (68.00%) 
“2) Basically unfair, since all Americans do not have an equal opportunity to succeed” (29.41%) 
“3) Don't know." (1.91%) 
Non-response (0.68%) 
Percentages shown are estimated nationally representative proportions using sample weights.  
N = 5001 (including non-response).   52
Table A2.  Summary statistics for selected regressors.
a 




Continuous Variables       
Income (Constructed by representing each of nine income categories by 
their estimated medians.  Category medians are estimated with data from 
the concurrent CPS March Supplement.) 
4571   46772.19  553.258
Age   4925    44.85   0.282
Age squared  4925 2311.82  28.437
Dummy Variables        
White 4899 0.809  0.006
Male 4998 0.476  0.008
Age group 2 (30-39 yrs.)  4925 0.222  0.006
Age group 3 (40-49 yrs.)  4925 0.204  0.006
Age group 4 (50-64 yrs.)  4925 0.189  0.006
Age group 5 (65-99 yrs.)  4925 0.165  0.006
High school graduate  4959 0.279  0.007
Technical, trade, or business degree after high school  4959 0.053  0.003
Some college  4959 0.269  0.007
College degree  4959 0.110  0.004
Some post-graduate education or more  4959 0.118  0.004
Child under 18 living at home  4967 0.388  0.007
Married 4961 0.541  0.008
Suburban 5001 0.477  0.008
Rural 5001 0.228  0.006
In last year, did not have enough money to buy clothing family needed  4988 0.174  0.006
In last year, did not have enough money to buy food family needed  4989 0.110  0.005
In last year, did not have enough money to pay for medical care   4980 0.218  0.006
Worries that income will not meet bills: most of the time  4971 0.444  0.008
Worries that income will not meet bills: some of the time  4971 0.119  0.005
Worries that income will not meet bills: almost never  4971 0.094  0.005
Union member  4966 0.108  0.005
Employed part-time  4961 0.129  0.005
Not employed  4961 0.307  0.007
Non-home assets >$0<$1000  4453 0.029  0.003
Non-home assets ≥$1000<$5000 4453 0.057  0.004
Non-home assets ≥$5000<$10,000 4453 0.067  0.004
Non-home assets ≥$10,000<$30,000 4453 0.162  0.006
Non-home assets ≥$30,000<$50,000 4453 0.109  0.005
Non-home assets ≥$50,000<$75,000 4453 0.068  0.004
Non-home assets ≥$75,000<$100,000 4453 0.047  0.003
Non-home assets ≥$100,000<$250,000 4453 0.079  0.004
Non-home assets ≥$250,000<$500,000 4453 0.032  0.003
Non-home assets >$500,000  4453 0.032  0.003
a The full specification includes 75 occupation dummies that are not summarized in this table.  
b 
Means are estimated from the nationally representative weighted sample.   53
      
Table A3. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution assuming a linear redistributive 
scheme. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Belief that economic system is   -0.687***  -0.619***  -0.615*** 
  fair  (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.053) 
Transformed  income  variable  1.140*** 0.699*** 0.261 
  (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) 
White   -0.113  -0.149* 
   (0.079)  (0.083) 
Male   -0.156  -0.187* 
   (0.10)  (0.11) 
White*male   -0.099  -0.092 
   (0.12)  (0.12) 
Age   4.7E-4  -0.008 
   (0.017)  (0.018) 
Age squared    -7.0E-5  -6.3E-6 
   (1.5E-5)  (1.6E-4) 
High school graduate    -0.147*  -0.075 
   (0.080)  (0.084) 
Technical, trade, or business     -0.079  0.034 
  degree after high school    (0.11)  (0.12) 
Some college    -0.425***  -0.310*** 
   (0.082)  (0.089) 
College degree    -0.372***  -0.213** 
   (0.092)  (0.10) 
Some post-graduate education or     -0.378***  -0.218** 
  more    (0.090)  (0.10) 
Children under 18 living at home    -0.011  -0.049 
   (0.053)  (0.057) 
Married   -0.062  -0.083 
   (0.051)  (0.055) 
Suburban   -0.038  -0.041 
   (0.052)  (0.055) 
Rural   0.070  0.074 
   (0.061)  (0.065) 
Observations    4362 4292 4037 
Wald  chi-square  298.3 382.3 519.3 
See notes to Table 1. 
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Table A4. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution assuming a redistributive scheme 
with constant progressivity. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Belief that economic system is   -0.673***  -0.609***  -0.613*** 
  fair  (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.053) 
Log income  -0.276***  -0.194***  -0.088* 
 (0.029)  (0.036)  (0.048) 
White   -0.106  -0.147* 
   (0.079)  (0.083) 
Male   -0.150  -0.185* 
   (0.10)  (0.11) 
White*male   -0.104  -0.096 
   (0.11)  (0.12) 
Age   -8.5E-4  -0.008 
   (0.017)  (0.018) 
Age squared    -6.3E-5  -3.8E-6 
   (1.5E-4)  (1.6E-4) 
High school graduate    -0.140*  -0.074 
   (0.079)  (0.084) 
Technical, trade, or business     -0.070  0.033 
  degree after high school    (0.11)  (0.12) 
Some college    -0.401***  -0.306*** 
   (0.082)  (0.089) 
College degree    -0.331***  -0.204** 
   (0.092)  (0.10) 
Some post-graduate education or     -0.318***  -0.204* 
  more    (0.091)  (0.11) 
Children under 18 living at home    -0.012  -0.049 
   (0.053)  (0.057) 
Married   -0.041  -0.074 
   (0.051)  (0.055) 
Suburban   -0.033  -0.039 
   (0.052)  (0.055) 
Rural   0.060  0.070 
   (0.061)  (0.066) 
Observations 4362  4292  4037 
Wald chi-square  325.5  399.0  521.5 
See notes to Table 1. 
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Table A5. Probit regressions predicting support for redistribution allowing for type-specific 
preferences assuming a Stone-Geary utility function and the linear redistribution scheme. 
Log income  0.693*** 
 (0.16) 






Some college or more  -0.003 
 (0.098) 
Belief*some college or more  -0.419*** 
 (0.13) 
Observations 2203 
Wald chi-square  289.6 
See notes to Table 3. 
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